December 2, 1978 is a day that Khmer history repeated itself when
Hanoi created a Khmer polity to serve its own interest in the third
time–the Unified Khmer Issarak 1946, the Khmer Revolutionary Communist
Party 1951, and the Khmer National United Front for National Salvation
(KNUFNS) December, 02 1978. A creating of
the KNUFUS based on two factors: a historical fulfilment and an urgent
need of Hanoi. Historically, Vietnam at least failed three times to
conquer Cambodia–a failure of Vietnamization in Cambodia by Emperor Minh
Mang and his successor Thiev Tree in 1848, a failure to create an
autonomous zone for the Khmer Vietminh after Geneva Conference 1954, and
a forceful withdrawal of Vietcong troops from Khmer Rouge liberated
zones in 1973. Urgently, Pol Pot’s troop’s reckless and anarchic
behaviors along Cambodia-Vietnam borders, created a serious security
threat to Vietnamese civilians along the borders. Pol Pot’s purge
against his own party members created exodus of Khmer Rouge defectors
and refugee into Vietnam. After series meetings of the Vietnamese
Politburo members chaired by Le Duan, Vietnam solemnly declared that it
could no longer coexist with a hostile regime of Democratic Kampuchea (
DK), and it officially set up the KNUFNS on December 2, 1978 to
overthrow Pol Pot’s regime by fomenting uprising from inside or
launching a full scale invasion.
In Summer 1978, Vietnam set up training camps for the former Khmer
Vietminh: Pen sovann, Chan Chi, Bou Thang, Chea Soth… along with the
Khmer Rouge defectors: Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, Hun Sen, Pol Saroeun, Sar
Kheng and so on. An intensive program of military training and
indoctrination was introduced to make sure they have enough skill to
fight alongside « brother-in-arms » with the Vietnamese troops and still
faithful to Hanoi and the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union. By
late 1978, a new strong Khmer Rouge defector battalion was commissioned
and capable to engage in a tough battle abreast with their Vietnamese
comrades. As every thing set ready to go, Le Duc Tho told them that
Vietnam would launch a full scale invasion on Cambodia in the upcoming
dry season.
When Vietnam was well prepared for invasion, Pol Pot was so busy to
fight his own internal enemies. A totalitarian despotism’s purge can
strengthen or weaken its own regime easily; Stalin and Mao’s purges on
their internal enemies were more successful as they did not fight the
two battles at the same time. In contrast, Pol Pot was facing two
battles at once–to face imminent threat from Hanoi and suspected
internal uprisings fomented by the Vietnamese. However, what Pol Pot
had handled with his own party members bled his regime to death.
According to Philip Short, a famous author of Anatomy of a Nightmare,
the DK’s armed forces spent 60 percent of their energies to extirpate
their internal enemies. And those people whom Pol Pot had suspected as
his internal enemies were not all true, but most of them were faithful
members and brave soldiers and commanders on the battlefield against the
Vietnamese incursions along the border. By the time of the Vietnamese
invasion, Pol Pot left only 30,000 reliable troops under the three zone
commanders– Son Sen, Ta Mok, and Keo Pauk, facing the much larger and
well-armed Vietnamese troops.
A purge started in full scale from early 1977 with Chan Chackrey, a
young military commander in Eastern Zone, a long with Ney Sarann, a
Northeast party secretary, Koy Thoun, a Northern secretary, Chou Chet, a
Western secretary, Rous Nhim, a Northwest secretary, and So Phim a
powerful Eastern secretary. All these top leaders were brought to S-21
for interrogating and torturing before killing, except So Phim was
ambushed when he was summoned to see Pol Pot in Phnom Penh, and he
committed suicide after wounding with an ambush by Pol Pot’s security
forces, according to Philip Short, but there were some different
accounts surrounding So Phim’s death. Albeit in late 1978, only a few
weeks away from the Vietnamese invasion, Vorn Vet, a Senior Politburo
member and Kong Sophal, a Northwest military commander, were brought to
S-21. A wipe out of military structures in Eastern, Northwest, West,
and Northeast Zones completely brought the regime into a state of limbo.
By the end of 1978, over 6,000 of party members were exterminated
through S-21, and over 100,000 Eastern Zone civilians and troops were
massacred by the central command. This is a grave mistake that never
committed by any leader against his or her own people while the nation
is facing the foreign onslaughts.
Although in such vulnerable situation, Pol Pot
felt no sense of defeat; since 1978 he adopted an aggressive stand
toward Hanoi. Pol Pot said, « We must attack them first, or they will
attack us. » Meanwhile, Hanoi accused Beijing of using Cambodia to put
pressure on Vietnam to return to the Chinese camp. Vietnam also feared
of a Khmer Rouge new air base built by China in Kampong Chnang, which is
just 30 minutes fly from Ho-Chi Ming City. Now the border skirmishes
between Cambodia and Vietnam and China and Vietnam increased frequently.
the DK interpreted all Hanoi actions through a prism of Khmer
ancestral struggle against their traditional enemies the same as the
Vietnamese’s view of China is distorted by atavistic memories of Chinese
suzerainty and repression. Nonetheless, the Vietnamese totally ignored
or forgot about their view toward China the same as Khmer view toward
them.
As the nation in a state of limbo, on September 1978, Pol Pot
secretly flew to Beijing to meet Deng Xiaoping to beg China for military
and economic helps. Pol Pot’s ferocious behaviors toward Hanoi forced
China to face its dilemma. Deng privately rebuked the Khmer Rouge
troops’ anarchic and brutal behaviors along the Cambodia-Vietnam border.
Deng repeatedly told Pol Pot that China would only support him with
weapons whereas a conduct of war was ultimately on Pol Pot’s
responsibility. Pol Pot might fail to comprehend Deng’s warning. While
Pol Pot was in Beijing, a diplomatic front was heating up around the
region.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Dong visited ASEAN member-nations
to garner supports from those non-Communist nations, but in Malaysia,
Dong’s request for support was politely rejected by most members, for it
was too much, too sudden, and too late. Furthermore, Dong’s request
for normalized relation with the US also failed, for President Carter
regarded relationship with China as his priority while normalization
with Hanoi would be put on hold. As diplomatic mission failed in the
non-Communist countries, now Vietnam saw its old friend, the Soviet as
its final resort for support of the upcoming war. Three weeks later in
Moscow, Le Duan and Leonid Breznez signed a friendship treaty to
safeguard their security from any reckless attack by China.
A new friendship treaty between Moscow and Hanoi made China a bid
nervous, but it felt confident that the Soviet would not risk a World
War to defense Hanoi. Now it was a turn for China to solicit its war
support from the region. Den Xiaoping visited Thailand and Malaysia,
and he claimed that Vietnam was a parcel of the Soviet Bloc, and it
posed a potential security threat in the region. Thailand and Malaysia
saw an opportunity to bargain with China; they agreed to support China’s
war effort in exchange with China to cease support the Communist
insurgencies in their homelands. Now as the Soviet supported Vietnam
and China supported Cambodia, the US called the Cambodia-Vietnam
conflict « a proxy war » between the Soviet and China. Washington saw
Vietnam as « a Cuba of the East » –a stalking horse for the Soviet
ambitions undertaking Asia the same role as Castro played in Latin
America and Africa. Seeing this danger, The US agreed to begin the
US-China military contact–a de facto alliance against the Soviet’s
hegemony in the region.
Now both sides had wrapped up their diplomatic efforts and troop
mobilizations along the borders. As previous pledge by Hanoi, on
Christmas Eve of 1978, the Vietnamese advanced columns set out from
multiple directions toward Phnom Penh under a command of General Le Duc
Anh. By December 30, Northeast and Eastern zones fell under the
Vietnamese control, and on January 7, 1979, the DK’s Leadership
completely abandoned Phnom Penh in disarray without a fight that
surprised the foreign diplomats as well as the whole people. A quick
fall of Phnom Penh without a resistance proved that Pol Pot’s regime had
severely suffered a big blow from its own internal purge and
persecution on its own people during the war time. Since then, a
historical fulfillment of Hanoi has been put in place in Cambodia
through its proxy regime until today.